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Exchange rates and monetary policy frameworks in EMEs 
Andrew Filardo, Guonan Ma and Dubravko Mihaljek
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1. Introduction 
Financial integration has reshaped monetary policy frameworks and transmission channels in 
emerging markets over the past few years. Both short-term and long-term interest rates in 
emerging market economies (EMEs) have become more responsive to foreign financial 
conditions. One important channel for the transmission of external factors on monetary policy 
is the exchange rate. The current environment of rising inflation and currency appreciation 
pressures in many EMEs poses a particular challenge, as monetary policy now faces a more 
difficult trade-off between price stability and exchange rate stability. Indeed, many central 
banks highlight the increased influence of external shocks in formulating domestic monetary 
policy in their contributions to this meeting. 
Against this background, this paper discusses the motives for stabilising nominal exchange 
rates in emerging markets; how far central banks can sustain a target for the real exchange 
rate over the medium term; how the notions of long-run equilibrium exchange rates influence 
monetary policy strategies; and how monetary policy frameworks and actual decisions could 
incorporate exchange rate movements. The discussion is based on central bank papers 
published in this volume and questionnaire responses prepared for this meeting, as well as 
our own analysis, with a focus on the period from 2007 to early 2011. 
The main findings of our paper are as follows. First, at least since 2009, central banks in 
emerging markets have been managing the value of their currencies more actively via some 
combination of reserve accumulation, policy interest rates and administrative measures. 
Second, motives for influencing exchange rates vary across jurisdictions, reflecting concerns 
about large capital flows, undesired spillovers from swings in global risk aversion and long-
run external competitiveness. Third, more active currency management puts a premium on 
our understanding of equilibrium exchange rates, notions of which are still difficult to define 
conceptually and empirically. Finally, policy rates and exchange rate flexibility are critical 
tools in addressing the challenges facing EME central banks today, but there is no 
consensus yet on how best to incorporate exchange rate movements into monetary policy 
frameworks. 
The remainder of the paper consists of five parts. Section 2 highlights key motives for 
stabilising nominal exchange rates. Section 3 discusses practical limitations for central banks 
that aim to sustain a target for the real exchange rate over the medium term. Section 4 
reviews various notions of long-run equilibrium exchange rates used by central banks, and 
how they influence monetary policy strategies. Section 5 presents a simple analytical 
framework for discussing how monetary policy frameworks and actual decisions could 
incorporate exchange rate movements. Section 6 concludes. 
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2.  Motives for stabilising nominal exchange rates 
Why do central banks in emerging markets try to stabilise exchange rates of the currencies 
they issue? And how valid are these motives on theoretical and empirical grounds?  
Whether central banks in emerging markets aim to stabilise nominal exchange rates 
depends in the first instance on the monetary policy framework and exchange rate regime 
they have adopted.
2 Thus, central banks that operate a currency board or a fixed exchange 
rate regime, such as the Hong Kong Monetary Authority or the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority, have a legal mandate to keep the external value of the domestic currency stable. 
Accordingly, they tailor their policy instruments to manage the exchange rate against a 
benchmark – exchange rate stability is simply the overriding goal of monetary policy. 
For other exchange rate arrangements, the motives for stabilising exchange rates fall into 
roughly two broad categories: concerns about the short-term impact on macroeconomic and 
financial stability; and concerns about the medium- to long-term impact on resource allocation.  
Short-term motives. All central banks naturally incorporate issues of exchange rate 
fluctuations into their respective monetary policy strategies. As noted in the National Bank of 
Poland paper in this volume, central banks are ultimately concerned about exchange rate 
movements even in a floating regime because these movements influence inflation. Ideally, 
floating exchange rates play a macroeconomic stabilisation role by absorbing various 
shocks. However, experience in emerging markets has shown all too often that significant 
short-term exchange rate movements that deviate from fundamentals can also affect 
macroeconomic performance. 
Another reason why central banks in an independent floating regime may occasionally want 
to stabilise exchange rate movements is that exchange rate volatility may affect financial 
stability. This may occur, for instance, if markets for hedging exchange rate risk are 
underdeveloped, as is often the case in EMEs; in financially dollarised economies; or, more 
generally, in EMEs in which the financial sector is small relative to the size of short-term 
capital flows. Nominal exchange rates of emerging market currencies tend to fluctuate very 
widely, both with respect to benchmark currencies such as the US dollar (Graph 1) and in 
effective terms (Appendix Graph  A1). For instance, during the crisis of 2008–09, the 
currencies of Brazil, Korea, Poland and Russia first weakened by 40–60% against the dollar 
(between October 2008 and February 2009) and then appreciated by 20–40% (between 
March and September 2009) (Graph 1). Such large swings in exchange rates may affect 
financial markets and the real sector, especially if they result from capital inflows, sharp 
terms of trade swings, or other shocks that are deemed to be temporary or unrelated to the 
fundamental determinants of exchange rates.
3  
A particular concern is that exchange rate fluctuations will encourage speculative behaviour 
on the basis of expectations that the exchange rate will continue to appreciate, as noted in 
the Bank of Russia contribution. Depending on the maturity structure and currency 
denomination of assets and liabilities in the economy, sharp exchange rate movements could 
result in liquidity shortages and trigger significant balance sheet effects, which may require 
central bank action to stabilise the system – for instance, by providing short-term foreign 
currency liquidity to the banks. Central banks have been also concerned that much of the 
recent exchange rate appreciation has been due to the wide interest rate differentials with 
                                                  
2   The fundamental choice of exchange rate regime goes beyond the scope of this paper; instead we focus on 
issues associated with modifications of strategies within existing regimes.  
3   For a discussion of the concerns about exchange rate volatility in emerging markets, see Calvo and Reinhart 
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respect to advanced economies, which is seen to result largely from the continuation of the 
near zero policy rates in advanced economies. 
 
Graph 1 
Nominal exchange rates against the US dollar
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1  US dollars per unit of local currency. An increase indicates appreciation of local currency. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; national data. 
 
A comparison of the pre- and post-crisis periods provides some support to concerns about the 
increased volatility in foreign exchange markets. The implied volatility (derived from foreign 
exchange options) of emerging market exchange rates has been generally higher since the 
start of the recovery in March 2009 than it was before September 2008 – the notable 
exception was the Thai baht (Graph 2). This suggests greater market uncertainty about 
exchange rates in the near term, a concern for policymakers in emerging market economies.  
 
Graph 2 
Implied volatility of exchange rates against the US dollar
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1  Implied volatility is derived from spot at-the-money exchange rate against US dollar options. 
Sources: JPMorgan Chase; BIS calculations. 40  BIS Papers No 57
 
Recent policy discussions have highlighted one related motive for stabilising nominal 
exchange rates: in recent years, the demand for EME currencies has proved sensitive to 
changes in risk aversion in international markets. Thus, during the global financial market 
boom from 2003 to 2007, key emerging market currencies strengthened: the Brazilian real by 
150%; the Indian rupee by almost 30%; the renminbi and other widely traded emerging 
market currencies by 15–20% (Graph 3). The Lehman bankruptcy and its aftermath led to a 
flight from emerging market assets, and the dollar value of most EME currencies plunged. 
The renminbi was an exception: it did not fall against the dollar and rose sharply against 
other emerging market currencies (green line in Graph 3). A significant recovery in the 
exchange rates of EMEs other than the renminbi did not start until the end of the period of 
extreme volatility in global financial asset prices around March/April 2009. 
 
Graph 3 
Nominal exchange rates of major emerging market currencies  














The vertical line marks 15 September 2008 (the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy). 
1  Weighted average of four widely traded currencies – the Korean won, the Mexican peso, the South African rand and the 
Turkish lira, based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates; an increase indicates appreciation of the local currency; monthly 
averages.     
Sources: Thomson Reuters; BIS calculations. 
 
Over the past year, developments in major international currencies have again strongly 
affected movements in emerging market exchange rates. Following a brief period of 
downward pressure triggered by the sovereign debt crisis in Greece in May 2010, key 
emerging market currencies appreciated against the US dollar until October (Graph 1). In 
Brazil, Chile, Korea, Poland, South Africa and Turkey, the nominal exchange rates 
appreciated by 13–23%. However, since early November 2010, the dollar has partly 
recovered against some major currencies, as the outlook for the US economy improved and 
a new round of sovereign debt problems emerged in Europe. Reflecting these developments 
– and not necessarily the economic performance of emerging markets, which was fairly 
stable throughout the year – the appreciation trend of emerging market currencies has 
reversed since November 2010 (notably in central and eastern Europe (CEE) and Korea), 
flattened in others (Brazil, Mexico and many Asian EMEs) and continued among major 
commodity exporters (including Chile and South Africa) (Graph 1).  
Longer-term motives. For central banks operating managed exchange rate regimes, the 
additional motives for exchange rate stabilisation include the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations on external competitiveness and the impact of possible exchange rate 
misalignment on resource allocation in the long term.  
At a theoretical as well as empirical level, one can find some justification for concerns about 
the impact of exchange rates on external competitiveness. The demand for many emerging 
market exports is fairly price elastic. This may result in the loss of market share even in the 
short run. Furthermore, exchange rate appreciation puts the tradable sector at a BIS Papers No 57  41
 
disadvantage relative to the non-tradable sector in the home country. Depending on the 
country’s initial external position, this can lead relatively quickly to external imbalances and 
financial instability. 
The arguments for stabilising exchange rates in order to avoid resource misallocation in the 
long term seem less persuasive. Floating exchange rates do have a tendency to overshoot 
their long-term trend values for prolonged periods (see Section 4). This was the case with 
many CEE currencies during the long cyclical upswing from around 2003 to mid-2008. 
However, whether such deviations lead to potentially irreversible loss of capacity in the 
tradable sector – the so-called “Dutch disease” – is less clear. Structural change and shifts in 
comparative advantage are ultimately driven by technical innovation, income growth and 
shifts in labour skills. Maintaining stable exchange rates or resisting exchange rate 
appreciation will not prevent adjustments in industrial structure from taking place; it may only 
postpone the inevitable adjustments – eg the shrinking of textile or steel industries – at a 
large cost to the economy in terms of resource misallocation in the long term. Moreover, a 
false sense of exchange rate stability may lead to currency mismatches in the private sector 
that prove very costly to unwind, as demonstrated by the Asian crisis of 1997–98 and the 
recent experience of the Baltic states.  
Evidence from policy responses. Policy moves over the past two years indicate that 
central banks and other policymakers in emerging markets have employed various tools to 
influence the stability of exchange rates: foreign exchange intervention and reserve 
accumulation; targeted administrative measures, including taxes, to dampen the inflows; and 
other restrictions on short-term capital inflows. 
One significant manifestation of EMEs’ efforts to stabilise their currencies has been rapid 
reserve accumulation. As shown in Table 1, the EMEs accumulated almost $1.3 trillion in 
reserves over 2009 and 2010, reflecting aggregate current account surpluses of $440 billion 
in 2009 and $345 billion in 2010, as well as net capital inflows of, respectively, $300 billion 
and $260 billion in the past two years. While the aggregate external surplus of emerging 
markets is lower today than before the crisis, the fact that it is not showing signs of durable 
decline is once again raising the question of global imbalances and the need for their 
adjustment. 
Another piece of evidence is that many inflation targeting central banks that normally do not 
intervene have recently found merit in foreign exchange intervention. For example, the 
National Bank of Poland notes in its contribution that very large, bubble-like deviations of the 
exchange rate from levels seen as sustainable over the medium term can amplify rather than 
absorb the shocks. Its guidelines for monetary policy in 2010–11 thus state that the floating 
exchange rate regime does not rule out foreign exchange interventions should they turn out 
necessary to ensure domestic macroeconomic and financial stability (NBP (2010)). The 
National Bank of Poland thus intervened in April 2010 for the first and only time since 1998 to 
reduce the volatility of the zloty and increase the risk facing investors engaging in momentum 
trading strategies. Similarly, the Central Bank of Chile has recently resumed regular 
interventions in the foreign exchange market, as the central bank estimated that a reserve 
buffer was needed to better deal with the contingency of a significant deterioration of the 
external environment. In Asia too, most inflation targeting central banks have experienced 
noticeable reserve accumulation since early 2009. 
A further indication of attempts to stabilise exchange rates comes from indicators of 
exchange rate volatility. Some EME central banks aim to stabilise their bilateral exchange 
rate against a major international currency such as the US dollar, while others tend to 
manage their currencies on a trade-weighted basis. By comparing volatilities of the bilateral 
US dollar exchange rate with that of the nominal effective exchange rate, one can gauge the 
relative weight central banks put on the basket of currencies against which they benchmark 
their own currency. A higher ratio indicates a relatively greater basket orientation – some 42  BIS Papers No 57
 
analysts also take ratios much higher than 100 to indicate a relatively high basket orientation, 




In billions of US dollars 
Current account 
balance  Net capital inflows  Reserve assets
2 
  2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Emerging  Asia  426 372 207  74  –600  –444 
China  297 270 141  71  –399  –345 
Hong  Kong  SAR  18 19 44  –18  –71 –2 
India  –36  –44 40 60  –4  –15 
Indonesia*  11 6 3  10  –12  –16 
Korea*  43 26 25 –5  –69  –18 
Malaysia  32  32 –23 –21  –4 –11 
Philippines*  9  8 –2 –0  –6 –7 
Singapore  32  44 –20 –33  –11 –11 
Thailand*  20 11 –1 10  –24  –19 
Latin  America  –15 –47  63 109  –45 –72 
Argentina  6  6  –10 –7  –1 –2 
Brazil*  –24  –52 66 86  –45  –38 
Chile*  4 –1 –2 –3  –2  0 
Columbia*  –5 –8  7 10  –1 –2 
Mexico*  –5  –12 15 32  –5  –20 
Peru*  0 –2  1 11  –1 –9 
Venezuela  9  22 –14 –20  10  –1 
CEE  27 20 27 80  –30  –83 
Czech  Republic*  –2  –2 5 2  –3  –2 
Hungary*  0 1 9 0  –9  –2 
Poland*  –7  –11 37 31  –15  –13 
Russia*  50 70  –33 –7  –3  –51 
Turkey*  –14 –38  9  54  –0 –15 
Other  EMEs  19  31 1 9  9  –42 
Algeria  0 5 4 2  –5  –7 
Israel  7 12  6 –6  –17 –8 
Saudi  Arabia  23 29  –22 –5  33  –24 
South  Africa*  –11  –15 13 18  –2 –3 
Total emerging 
markets   438 345 297 263  –675  –599 
1    Inflation targeting economies are indicated with an asterisk. Data for 2010 are estimates.       
2  A  negative  sign 
indicates an increase in foreign exchange reserves. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
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The change in this ratio over time can also be used as an indicator of a shifting orientation in 
exchange rate management. The recent evidence indicates that quite a few EMEs have 
gravitated toward basket-oriented management (Ma and McCauley (2010)). Graph 4 
suggests that, since early 2009, this is the case with Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Russia and Turkey, among others. In addition, Chinese authorities in June 2010 
put more emphasis on the role of the effective exchange rate in their policy regime. A 
possible reason for EMEs to shift their orientation is to diversify away from US dollar risk; in 
addition, some Asian economies see benefits in enhancing intraregional currency stability 
and promoting the growth of the region’s supply chains. 
 
Graph 4 
Ratio of bilateral to nominal effective exchange rate volatilities
1 
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1  Ratio of standard deviation of weekly return on bilateral exchange rate of the home currency against the US dollar, to 
standard deviation of weekly return on nominal effective exchange rate of the home currency. 
Source: BIS calculations. 
3.  Real exchange rate as a medium-term policy target 
The increased emphasis on managing exchange rates in emerging markets in recent years 
presents a number of operational challenges. One justification for this approach by 
policymakers has been the desire to reduce “excessive” exchange rate volatility. This 
assumes that one can reasonably estimate excessive movements, on both the upside and 
the downside. Moreover, underlying this assumption is a notion of a medium-term target for 
the real exchange rate. At least three questions arise: How does a central bank set the 
target? Which tools could it use to achieve it? And what are the constraints on maintaining 
the target?  
Setting a target for the real exchange rate over the medium term requires a guidepost as a 
reference. Many options have been proposed, each having advantages and drawbacks. One 
notion of the equilibrium exchange rate is based on long-term economic fundamentals: the 
next section will argue that this is difficult to quantify. Various measures are being used by 
central banks in emerging markets, as our survey indicates (Table 2), but there is no 
consensus on the best approach.
4 
Some concepts are intuitively clear – for instance, the notion that exchange rate appreciation 
is driven by fundamentals such as productivity differentials between tradable and 
non-tradable sectors in EMEs relative to advanced economies (the Balassa-Samuelson 
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effect).
5 Even these well known concepts are difficult to operationalise. Calculating 
“permissible” real exchange rate appreciation within the Balassa-Samuelson framework 
requires a large amount of high-quality data that are not always available in emerging market 
economies. One measure of the challenge is that emerging market central banks have yet to 
solve the simpler problem of correctly measuring wage and price changes when calculating 
real exchange rates.  
Regarding the tools used to achieve a targeted exchange rate, central banks in emerging 
markets traditionally rely on foreign exchange intervention (to influence the nominal 
exchange rate) and sterilisation (to offset the increase in banking system liquidity resulting 
from intervention). These techniques are well known, and central banks in emerging markets 
generally view them as effective (Mihaljek (2005)). However, the literature on intervention 
and sterilisation finds that such actions entail various risks and costs that eventually affect 
both the ability and the willingness of central banks to resist exchange rate movements. 
These include valuation losses, sterilisation costs and, in particular, increased commercial 
bank lending resulting from partial or ineffective sterilisation.
6 Prolonged intervention can also 
result in the perception by the markets of a one-sided exchange rate bet. In such conditions, 
carry trade dynamics easily arise. Where one-sided bets accumulate, central banks may 
have an incentive to trade in a discretionary fashion on the other side. This may help to 
balance the order flows, but it may also lead to losses for the central bank.  
Apart from the costs of intervention and sterilisation, general macroeconomic developments 
can also constrain the willingness of central banks to sustain a target for the exchange rate. 
Since late 2010, for instance, growing domestic inflationary pressures have complicated 
trade-offs associated with intervention, measures to dampen capital inflows and conventional 
monetary policy. The recent monetary policy environment in China illustrates this point: even 
though foreign exchange intervention and capital controls have been successful in limiting 
the pace and extent of nominal currency appreciation, they may not be able to succeed in 
alleviating inflationary pressures arising from the expansion of banking sector balance 
sheets. The policy alternatives are also problematic at this stage. Higher interest rates would 
help to rein in inflationary pressures but could wind up attracting additional capital inflows. 
And, an unchanged policy mix would mean that the costs and risks associated with foreign 
reserve accumulation would rise further. 
Finally, controversy remains over the role of prolonged foreign exchange interventions by 
emerging market central banks in the face of persistent global current account imbalances. 
One perspective is that such actions impede global readjustments and even push down 
yields on very liquid international assets, which in turn compresses risk premia, inflates asset 
prices and lowers the perceived imperative for fiscal consolidation in advanced economies. 
Another perspective is that large fiscal deficits, easy monetary policy and quantitative easing 
in advanced economies aggravate global current account imbalances, prompting capital 
flows to emerging markets that result in EME central banks undertaking foreign exchange 
interventions. These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive. 
                                                  
5   The Balassa-Samuelson effect starts from the observation that productivity growth in the traded goods sector 
has historically been faster than in the non-traded goods sector. By the law of one price, the prices of 
tradables tend to get equalised across countries, while the prices of non-tradables do not. Higher productivity 
in the tradable goods sector will bid up wages in that sector and, with labour being mobile, wages in the entire 
economy will rise. Producers of non-tradables will be able to pay the higher wages only if the relative price of 
non-tradables rises. This will lead to an increase in the overall price level and hence real exchange rate 
appreciation. 
6   See, for instance, the accompanying background paper on intervention and central bank balance sheets, and 
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4.  Equilibrium exchange rates and monetary policy strategies in 
EMEs  
How do notions of equilibrium exchange rates influence monetary policy strategies in 
emerging markets? As discussed in several central bank contributions to this volume, many 
emerging market central banks have concluded that recent capital inflows and real effective 
exchange rate appreciation are to a considerable extent due to sounder fundamentals in their 
countries. This is one of the conclusions in the central bank papers from the Czech Republic, 
Israel, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa and Thailand, among others. Several central 
banks also view the sizeable growth differential between the EMEs as a whole and the 
advanced economies as permanent, not cyclical. Similarly, some central banks (eg the South 
African Reserve Bank) now consider increased foreign investment in emerging market debt 
as structural in nature. These considerations would imply that the equilibrium real exchange 
rate of many EMEs has appreciated over the past few years and, hence, that the observed 
real effective exchange rate appreciation is consistent with equilibrium dynamics. 
Nevertheless, commodity exporters, small open economies, and the EMEs that are closely 
integrated with advanced economies – such as Israel, Mexico and central European 
countries – remain more dependent on exports and growth in developed countries than the 
large economies of Brazil, China and India. For these smaller EMEs, large real appreciation 
can imply a palpable decline in external competitiveness. As noted by the Bank of Israel, real 
exchange rate misalignments that are due to medium-term deviations of the actual exchange 
rate from the equilibrium real exchange rate could result in inefficient resource allocation over 
the cycle, including underutilisation of factors of production in some periods and 
overutilisation in others.  
More solid evidence on where the equilibrium exchange rate might be at a point in time 
would enhance the ability of central banks to assess the implications of exchange rate 
fluctuations for policymaking. To illustrate this point, note that real effective exchange rates 
have fluctuated considerably over the past few years. If we compare the situation in early 
2011 with the long-term average for the pre-crisis period from 2000 to 2007, the picture that 
emerges is one of very diverse developments across EMEs (Graph 5):  
–  strong real appreciation (40–60%) in Brazil and Russia;  
–  substantial appreciation (20–40%) in Indonesia, the Philippines, the Czech Republic, 
and Turkey; 
–  moderate appreciation (10–20%) in China, India, Singapore, Thailand, Chile, 
Hungary, Poland and South Africa; 
–  strong real depreciation (almost 40%) in Argentina; 
–  substantial real depreciation (10–20%) in Hong Kong SAR, Korea and Mexico; and  
–  stable real exchange rates compared to the 2000–07 average in Algeria, Israel, 
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Peru and Venezuela. 
These very different developments suggest that the determinants of equilibrium real 
exchange rates are likely to be fairly country-specific. No generalisations are possible and 
each central bank needs to feel its way to what the equilibrium exchange rate of its currency 
might be at a given point in time.  
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Graph 5 
Real effective exchange rates
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1  Broad index (58 countries); an increase indicates an appreciation. 
Sources: Datastream; BIS. 
 
One simple but crude measure of the equilibrium exchange rate is the PPP-implied nominal 
effective exchange rate, ie a trade-weighted basket of foreign currencies evaluated at PPP.
7 
Its main advantage is that estimates of PPP rates are readily available and can be easily 
compared with trade-weighted exchange rates, which most central banks typically compute 
on a monthly basis. Graph 6 shows that the PPP-implied exchange rate gaps can be large 
and very persistent. For instance, the rupee and the renminbi were, respectively, 60% and 
40% below their PPP-implied exchange rates in late 2010 (Graph 6, upper left-hand panel). 
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) pointed out, the size and persistence of these gaps constitute 
one of the big puzzles in international economics. One interpretation is that exchange rates 
are subject to very weak short- to medium-term feedbacks from fundamentals in financial 
markets and the real economy. The weak feedback also suggests that exchange rates may 
appear to become unanchored from economic fundamentals for extended periods of time, 
and that these price signals from the misaligned exchange rates lead to real distortions. This 
exchange rate disconnect perspective is confirmed in many studies of the predictability of 
exchange rates: a debate about whether exchange rates follow a random walk over short 
horizons is still going on (Rogoff and Stravrakeva (2004)), while for long horizons there is 
some evidence of predictability of exchange rates. 
                                                  
7   The purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate between two currencies is the rate at which the currency of 
one country needs to be converted into that of a second country to ensure that a given amount of the first 
country’s currency will purchase the same basket of goods and services in the second country as it does in 
the first. For comparison purposes, the PPP rates are expressed in units of local currency per US dollar. The 
advantages and disadvantages of using PPP-based exchange rates are discussed in Callen (2007) and IMF 
(2003, Box 1.2).  BIS Papers No 57  47
 
Another perspective about the size and persistence of the gaps highlights the possibility of 
significant measurement issues. The International Comparison Programme, which surveys 
prices globally, is a huge statistical undertaking to develop new, more precise international 
price comparisons; but such comparisons are available only at infrequent intervals. 
Nonetheless, the results of the programme raise questions about the use of PPP exchange 
rates even as a rough guide for central banks searching for an appropriate measure of the 
equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
Graph 6 
Gaps between NEERs and PPP-implied NEERs
1 
In per cent 





































































1  Difference between annual average nominal effective exchange rates and PPP-implied nominal effective exchange rates 
(both broad measures, 58 countries), in per cent. The effective exchange rate is a trade-weighted average of a basket of 
foreign currencies’ bilateral exchange rates; the PPP-implied effective exchange rate is a trade-weighted average of a basket 
of foreign currencies’ implied PPP conversion rates. Positive value indicates overvaluation vis-à-vis the basket.  
Sources: IMF; BIS calculations.  
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Many emerging market central banks have therefore been developing more sophisticated 
empirical models of equilibrium exchange rates. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a 
summary of more than a dozen currently used approaches to estimating equilibrium 
exchange rates.
8 One unresolved conceptual issue in this literature is the choice of the 
appropriate price index (CPI, tradable prices, unit labour costs, GDP deflators). Another is 
assumptions about the nature of adjustment mechanism in foreign exchange markets – is the 
main driver of adjustments uncovered interest rate parity over long horizons, or do internal 
and external imbalances in EMEs play a key role?  
Among central banks attending this meeting, only India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey do not prepare estimates of long-run equilibrium exchange rates (Table 2). Of those that 
do, Hungary, Korea and Malaysia do not publish their estimates because they consider them to 
be sensitive information that could be potentially disruptive to the foreign exchange market. 
Most central banks report in answers to the BIS questionnaire that they use a combination of 
behavioural (BEER) and fundamental (FEER) equilibrium exchange rate methodologies 
(including the Czech Republic, Colombia, Malaysia, Peru and Poland) (Table 2). Singapore 
and Thailand combine estimates from macroeconomic balance and BEER approaches; and 
Hungary, Israel and Korea those from external sustainability and FEER approaches. Algeria, 
Hong Kong SAR and the Philippines rely on the IMF’s three major Consultative Group on 
Exchange Rates (CGER) methodologies. The Central Bank of Algeria, for instance, 
intervenes on the foreign exchange market on the basis of inflation differentials against the 
major trading partners and other fundamental indicators of the domestic economy. Several 
central banks also look at the PPP estimates of equilibrium exchange rates (eg Colombia, 
the Philippines and Poland). Overall, the methodology for estimating equilibrium exchange 
rates seems to be particularly well developed in Colombia, the Czech Republic, Israel and 
Poland.  
Among the contributions to this volume, the paper by Bank of Israel analyses estimates of 
the equilibrium real exchange rate of the Israeli shekel and how they are used in deciding on 
FX interventions. The estimates based on a model derived from long-run fundamentals show 
that the Israeli currency was overvalued in early 2008. This prompted the central bank to 
start purchasing foreign currency, thereby probably contributing to a gradual realignment and 
some undervaluation in 2009, followed by convergence close to equilibrium in 2010. 
However, based on an alternative approach, the real exchange rate was still undervalued in 
2010 due to the relatively large current account surplus.  
In Colombia, the central bank staff routinely prepare estimates of long-run equilibrium 
exchange rates based on several methodologies: PPP, tradable/non-tradable relative prices 
(Balassa-Samuelson approach), BEER and FEER. The staff calculate estimates and 
confidence intervals for each methodology, and assess the probability of misalignment by 
examining the position of the current real exchange rate or nominal effective exchange rate 
with respect to the confidence intervals. This information is used to form a judgment on 
misalignments, which is in turn a key input in foreign exchange intervention decisions. Most 
methodologies are computed for a PPI-based, trade-weighted real exchange rate index, but 
the staff also examine other real exchange rate indices, including CPI-based indices and 
indices of competitiveness in third markets. 
 
                                                  
8   For literature reviews, see Égert (2003) and Égert et al (2006). BIS Papers No 57  49
 
Table 2 
Estimation of equilibrium exchange rate 
 Availability  Methodologies  Published 
studies
1 
Algeria  Yes  Real effective exchange rate (REER) and nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) with IMF methodology as 
the reference. 
N/A 
Colombia  Yes  Rates based on PPP, tradable/non-tradable relative 
prices, behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) 
and fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER). 
Yes 
Czech Republic  Yes  BEER, permanent equilibrium exchange rate (PEER), 
natural real exchange rate (NATREX), FEER and models 
related to sustainable real exchange rate (SRER). Also, the 
Czech National Bank develops original approaches, such 
as the pricing-to-market (disparity) and the autarchy (ie 
cross-border order flow-adjusted) exchange rate concept. 
Yes 
Hong Kong SAR  Yes  Three approaches adopted by the IMF: the equilibrium 
exchange rate approach, the macroeconomic balance 
approach and the external sustainability approach.  
Yes 
Hungary Yes  FEER.  Yes 
Israel Yes  REER.  Yes 
Korea  Yes  REER and FEER.  N/A 
Malaysia  Yes  Based on a combination of fundamentals and 
behavioural approaches. 
N/A 
Mexico No     
Peru  Yes  BEER and FEER.  Yes 
Philippines  Yes  The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’s multiple equation 
model (MEM), which generates exchange rate estimates 
based on PPP and interest rate parity conditions. The 
REER and the IMF’s CGER methodologies are also 
considered. 
Yes 
Poland  Yes  The National Bank of Poland takes into account the 
results of the International Comparison Programme, 
BEER, PPI-based real exchange rate of EUR/PLN,  
FEER and firm-level data relevant in exchange rate 
misalignment analyses. Also, the IMF’s CGER estimates 
are considered. 
Yes 
Russia N/A     
Saudi Arabia  Yes  Based on an overall assessment of the prevailing 
macroeconomic outlook. 
N/A 
Singapore Yes  BEER.  Yes 
Thailand  Yes  Two methodologies similar to those of the IMF: 
macroeconomic balance approach and BEER. 
Yes 
Turkey No     
1  N/A indicates information not provided by the central bank; publications are listed in Appendix Table A3. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire. 
 
In Poland, the central bank uses a FEER model to estimate the level of the real exchange 
rate that would be consistent with the simultaneous attainment of internal and external 
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of the current account that stabilises Poland’s net foreign debt at an exogenously set level. A 
particular feature of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) model is that it takes into account the 
supply side performance of the Polish economy, by incorporating firm-level data relevant in 
exchange rate misalignment analyses. The results of the model are updated quarterly and 
are presented to the Monetary Policy Council.
9 
The Czech National Bank paper in this volume discusses how measures of long-term 
equilibrium exchange rates have been used in assessing the timing of entry to the euro area. 
Because the long-term trend appreciation of the Czech koruna, which is driven by high 
productivity growth in its tradable sector, is expected to continue over the next decade, 
entering the euro area now would imply an expansionary shock to interest rates of 1½–3 
percentage points. This could lead to the boom and bust cycle observed in countries such as 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain before they entered the euro area in the 1990s.  
Many central banks in EMEs have faced a more pressing issue over the past year: How fast 
and how far can they allow exchange rates to appreciate before a potentially unhealthy 
dynamic in domestic asset markets develops? Here opinions clearly differ. One view, 
mentioned in the note by the Bank of Russia, is that allowing a sharp currency appreciation 
would create a two-way forex risk, limiting speculative inflows into domestic asset markets. A 
contrary view is that appreciation generates expectations of further appreciation, sparking 
increased carry trades and aggravating an overshooting of domestic asset prices.  
In practice, it is often difficult for policymakers to be precisely guided in their decisions by 
estimates generated from models of equilibrium exchange rates. Concerns about the impact 
of exchange rate volatility on financial stability and fears about the loss of export revenue 
should exchange rates ultimately overshoot factor into decisions by policymakers to resist 
exchange rate appreciation by applying some combination of interest rate and exchange rate 
policies. This issue is addressed in the next section. 
5.  Exchange rates in monetary policy frameworks: tools, targets or 
both? 
The preceding discussion indicated that the exchange rate can play two different roles in the 
monetary policy frameworks of emerging market economies. First, it can be used as a policy 
tool to help achieve the inflation target and output stabilisation. Second, it can be a separate 
target of monetary policy in a way similar to the inflation target. This section describes a 
simple conceptual framework that could be used to analyse these two roles of the exchange 
rate in monetary policy frameworks. 
5.1  Exchange rate as a policy tool 
To the extent that central banks can control both the policy rate and the nominal exchange 
rate – for instance, in a managed floating regime with incomplete capital mobility – the 
exchange rate could be used as a tool of monetary policy. Other things being equal, letting 
the nominal exchange rate appreciate would lower domestic prices of imports and help lower 
the import components of production costs and consumer prices.  
                                                  
9   These are the results of an economic climate survey conducted each quarter among more than 1,000 Polish 
enterprises. The indicator used most often is the median answer to the question “At which EUR/PLN rate does 
your export activity becomes unprofitable?” The results of the survey are posted on the NBP website and are 
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A special case of the use of the exchange rate as a monetary policy tool is that of Singapore. 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) operates a managed floating regime with 
domestic interest rates largely determined by foreign interest rates and the expected future 
movements of the Singapore dollar. To achieve price stability, MAS targets a trade-weighted 
value of the Singapore dollar so that it appreciates when the economy is overheating and 
depreciates when the economy is weak.  
One way to conceptualise this framework is to consider an exchange rate-augmented Taylor-
type rule, following the approach of Ball (1999): 
*
11 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )
T
tt t t t t Rf y y                       (1) 
where the right-hand side of equation (1) includes three terms of a conventional Taylor-type 
rule: a constant α; an inflation gap (πt–1 – π
T), defined as the deviation of inflation from its 
target; and the output gap (yt–1 – y
*
t–1), defined as the deviation of output from potential.
10 The 
left-hand side of the equation includes a weighted average of the policy interest rate, R, and 
the nominal exchange rate, f, with a weight ω that takes on values between zero and one. 
We can think of the weight ω as characterising various types of exchange rate regimes: a 
freely floating regime would be consistent with ω = 1; while ω = 0 is consistent with a 
Singapore-type framework. Intermediate values of ω would represent managed floating 
regimes. Equation (1) thus highlights possible trade-offs between the policy interest rate and 
the exchange rate as monetary policy tools in EMEs. Historically, the central banking practice 
of focusing on an average of the policy interest rate and the exchange rate was formalised at 
several central banks (eg the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and 
Sveriges Riksbank) as a monetary conditions index (MCI). In the past decade, formal MCI 
regimes have fallen out of fashion. 
From a theoretical point of view, Ball (1999) emphasises that the optimal choice of ω arises 
from consideration of the role of exchange rates in determining both output and inflation 
dynamics, and of the policymakers’ preferences for output and inflation variability.
11 
In practice, EME policymakers rely on more pragmatic assessments when choosing the best 
mix of policy rates and exchange rate movements. In recent years, greater willingness to 
manage exchange rates raises questions about how central banks have been deciding this 
policy mix. 
To inform the discussion of this issue, we estimated a version of equation (1) and plotted the 
fitted against the actual policy rates in the Appendix (Graph A2). Except for some end points, 
the estimated policy rates fit the actual policy rates fairly well in a number of countries, in 
particular Chile, India, Malaysia, Peru, Thailand and Turkey. For some of the others, the 
estimated policy rates can undershoot or overshoot the actual policy rates by a large margin 
at times, indicating the importance of factors other than inflation, output and exchange rates. 
Table A2 presents the coefficient estimates and test statistics for the corresponding 
regressions. The coefficient estimates on inflation and output gaps generally have the correct 
signs and are statistically significant. The coefficients on the exchange rate are somewhat 
more diverse. The negative signs would be consistent with a trade-off between changing the 
exchange rate and policy interest rates in determining the policy setting.  
                                                  
10  Ball (1999) also includes a lagged value of the exchange rate on the left-hand side of the equation. For 
expositional purposes, we drop this in equation (1), but include it when estimating the model. 
11   Formally, the results are derived from a standard linear-quadratic optimal monetary policy setup with a set of 
equations describing the macroeconomy and a standard quadratic loss function for the central bank in terms 
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5.2  Rethinking currency misalignments and monetary policy 
Engel (2011) has recently argued that currency misalignments should play a bigger role in 
the setting of monetary policy. He derives this result from a fully optimising model of 
monetary policy and shows that the appropriate loss function in such an economy depends 
on the square of the inflation gaps, output gaps and the average currency misalignment. In 
other words, his research suggests that central banks should target currency misalignments 
(in addition to inflation gaps and output gaps) to reduce the inefficient resource allocations 
associated with violations of purchasing power parity across economies. Questions remain 
about how relevant this research is for emerging market central banks. 
One simple way to think about this issue more formally is by adding a misalignment variable 
on the right-hand side of equation (1).
12 Such a simple instrument rule captures the notion 
that a central bank would use its policy tools to stabilise inflation, output and exchange rates 
around the inflation target, potential output and an appropriate measure of the equilibrium 
exchange rate, respectively. In this sense, such a simple monetary policy rule captures the 
notion of “leaning against the wind” with respect to exchange rate misalignments. 
It is important to note that this type of policy rule does not imply that central banks would 
narrowly focus on exchange rate deviations, as was the case with PPP-based exchange rate 
regimes in the 1980s and 1990s (Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)). Those regimes did not 
provide a strong nominal anchor for inflation expectations: in the face of an inflation shock, 
the nominal exchange rate would depreciate; this would raise import prices; and lead to 
further rounds of inflation via the pass-through effect, and so on. Over the past two decades, 
many EME central banks have gained credibility for achieving and maintaining price stability, 
so it is unlikely that the narrow PPP-based exchange rate regimes of the past would be seen 
as desirable today.  
Instead, this approach highlights the multiple objectives that central banks would try to 
balance simultaneously. First and foremost, price stability is important. This does not suggest 
that central banks aim to keep inflation at the target every period; rather, central banks aim to 
reduce inflation deviations – on either the upside or the downside – over time in a way 
consistent with price stability. The record for this approach to targeting inflation has been 
commendable in both advanced and emerging market economies (see eg Filardo and 
Genberg (2010)). 
Second, output stabilisation is also important. This objective can be explicit in the central 
bank’s preferences, as in the case of dual-mandate central banks such as the Federal 
Reserve. It can also reflect indirectly the important influence of the output gap on inflation 
dynamics, as is the case in many formal monetary policy models of inflation targeting.  
Finally, as with inflation and output stabilisation, central banks would not strictly target a 
given level of the exchange rate at each point in time. Rather, a central bank would factor in 
its policy decisions the desired speed at which to reduce the misalignment of the exchange 
rate from its equilibrium rate, along with concerns about inflation and the stage of the 
business cycle. Technically, the speed of adjustment in general equilibrium would reflect the 
central bank’s preferences and the time series behaviour of output, inflation, exchange rates 
and other key macroeconomic variables. 
A few other comments on policy horizons and measurement uncertainty deserve 
consideration.  
                                                  
12   It is important to note, as Engel (2011) does, that the proposed instrument rule is not unique under the 
assumptions in the model. For a discussion of instrument rules and targeting rules in his model based on that 
of Clarida et al (2002), see Section 9 of Engel (2011). BIS Papers No 57  53
 
Conventionally, the policy horizon for inflation and output stabilisation is one to two years. In 
cases where this is judged to be too short given the nature of shocks influencing the 
monetary policy environment – eg in the case of crises or other large and persistent 
macroeconomic shocks – the policy horizon can be appropriately extended. For exchange 
rates, the convergence to the equilibrium value may be much longer than for inflation and 
output. In part, this may be due to the fact that the determinants of exchange rates, such as 
inter-industry and international productivity differentials, take several years to adjust to their 
equilibrium values (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)). In such cases, central banks may prefer to 
allow the exchange rate to converge over a relatively long horizon and therefore avoid strong 
reactions to misalignments. 
Uncertainties about the measurement of equilibrium real exchange rates may also influence 
the desired speed of adjustment. The greater the uncertainty, the smaller generally will be 
the desired reaction to exchange rate misalignments.
13 Otherwise, spuriously measured 
deviations could result in undue volatility in policy actions.  
If measurement uncertainty is very pronounced, one could adopt a more state-dependent 
approach to incorporating exchange rate deviations into monetary policy decisions.
14 
Algebraically, one can think of an indicator function that would turn on a misalignment term in 
an extended version of equation (1) only when the deviation of the equilibrium exchange rate 
was deemed very large. This “second pillar” approach would take account of the longer-term 
risks, ie the risk arising from long-term resource misallocations that might be associated with 
exchange rates deviating too far for too long from reasonable estimates of equilibrium 
exchange rates. In practice, this would mean that the central bank may need to adjust policy 
rates even though inflation and output forecasts at conventional horizons appear well 
behaved. 
In sum, recent research puts a spotlight on the question of whether currency misalignments 
should play a role in monetary policy decisions generally and in EMEs particularly. The 
relevance of this research is likely to vary across economies. For relatively closed 
economies, this issue may be relatively minor. For open economies that face considerable 
deviations from the law of one price, this issue may be more important. Of course, difficulties 
in accurately measuring misalignments and in communicating with the public have to be 
factored in. Overall, this discussion raises issues of whether EME central banks that already 
target misalignments should do more, and whether those that do not should put greater 
emphasis on misalignments in the conduct of monetary policy. 
6. Conclusion 
Exchange rates have been playing an increasingly important role in the monetary policy 
decisions of emerging market economies in recent years. This has reflected not only the 
developments during the global financial crisis, but also features of the current conjuncture, 
including the impact on exchange rates of volatile capital flows, low global interest rates and 
spillovers from changes in risk aversion in global financial markets. Central banks have been 
concerned about the impact of heightened exchange rate volatility on macroeconomic and 
financial stability, as well as on external competitiveness and resource allocations. As a 
                                                  
13  Taylor and Williams (2010) point out that, in much of the literature on mismeasurement of variables such as 
the output gap, the optimal coefficient on the mismeasured variable declines in the presence of errors. See 
Svensson and Woodford (2000) for a theoretical exception to this general statement. 
14   For more details on this approach, see eg Svensson (2003) and Disyatat (2005). 54  BIS Papers No 57
 
result, many central banks are finding greater merit in stabilising exchange rates than in the 
past.  
Greater attention to exchange rate stability puts a premium on central banks’ understanding 
of equilibrium exchange rates. However, notions of equilibrium exchange rates are difficult to 
define conceptually and empirically. In addition, analytical work that incorporates exchange 
rate stability considerations into standard monetary policy frameworks is still in its infancy. 
Nonetheless, having achieved and maintained price stability, many emerging market central 
banks seem likely to extend their policy frameworks to reflect the potential role that exchange 
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1  Broad index (58 countries); an increase indicates an appreciation. 
Sources: Datastream; BIS calculations. 
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Graph A2 
Policy rates and those implied by the Taylor rule 
In per cent 
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Graph A2 (continued) 
Policy rates and those implied by the Taylor rule 
In per cent 
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1  Fitted  values  of  model  t t t t t
T
t t t f f y y R                      1
*
1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( , excluding the period Q1 2008–Q3 2009 and 
previous crises. R is the nominal policy rate; π is the headline inflation rate; π
T is the inflation target for inflation targeting 
countries; the five-year moving average of headline inflation is taken to be a proxy for the inflation objective in the other 
economies; y is output; y* is the output trend estimated with a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter 1,600); f is the 
year-on-year nominal effective exchange rate change.       
2    For Brazil, overnight Selic rate; for Chile, overnight interbank 
interest rate; for China, one-year lending rate; for the Czech Republic, two-week repo rate; for Hungary, base rate (two-week 
deposit rate); for India, reverse repo rate; for Indonesia, one-month SBI rate; for Korea, overnight call rate; for Malaysia, 
overnight policy rate; for Mexico, overnight repo rate; for Peru, reference rate; for the Philippines, overnight reserve repo rate; 
for Poland, seven-day reference rate; for Singapore, three-month interbank rate; for Thailand, 14-day repo rate before 
17 January 2007, overnight repo thereafter; for Turkey, overnight interbank rate.    
†  For Mexico and Turkey, the dependent 
variable is replaced with an inflation trend-augmented nominal policy rate, ) ( t t t r R    , where  is the trend of inflation and 
   R r . 

























Summary of empirical approaches to estimating equilibrium exchange rates 
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  π (–1)  y (–1)  f  f (–1) DW  R
2 Sample 
China 0.1*  0.4***      0.8  0.59  36 
 0.1***  0.4***  0.02 0.05**  1.0 0.77  36 
Hong Kong SAR  0.5***  0.5***      0.6  0.67  36 
 0.5***  0.4***  –0.03 0.14*  0.5 0.73  36 
India –0.0  0.3**     0.5  0.22  36 
 0.0  0.4**  –0.06* 0.04  0.8  0.39  36 
Indonesia 0.6***  0.9     0.6  0.51  36 
 0.5***  1.3*  0.08* –0.02  0.8  0.55  36 
Korea 0.0  0.5***      0.7  0.62  36 
 –0.0  0.5***  –0.03 0.00  0.6 0.67  36 
Malaysia 0.1***  0.1***      0.9  0.73  36 
 0.1***  0.2***  –0.03* 0.05***  0.8  0.83  36 
Philippines 0.2*  0.2      0.2  0.18  35 
 0.2**  0.4*  –0.09 0.03  0.5 0.28  35 
Singapore 0.0  0.2***     0.4  0.31  36 
  0.1  0.1 –0.04 0.24** 0.4  0.43 36 
Thailand 0.4***  –0.0      0.4  0.49  36 
 0.5***  –0.2  –0.03  0.18** 0.6  0.68 36 
Brazil 1.1***  1.8***      0.7  0.60  36 
 0.9***  1.6***  –0.07 –0.02  0.8  0.71  36 
Chile 0.5***  0.6***      1.5  0.86  36 
 0.4***  0.6***  –0.01 –0.01  1.4  0.87  36 
Mexico
†  0.5 0.5***      0.6  0.30  36 
 0.7  0.5***  –0.03 0.05  0.6 0.32  36 
Peru –0.0  0.7***      0.6  0.69  32 
 0.0  0.7***  –0.07 –0.06  0.6  0.76  32 
Czech Republic  0.2*  0.2***     0.2  0.41  36 
 0.1  0.2***  0.07** 0.02  0.4  0.65  36 
Hungary 0.2  0.2      0.3  0.08  36 
 0.1  0.2  0.07  –0.04 0.4  0.13  36 
Poland 0.1  –0.4*     0.5  0.40  36 
 0.1  –0.4*  –0.03  0.01 0.7  0.43  36 
Turkey
†  0.3*** 0.6***     0.5  0.38  35 
  0.1 0.9***  –0.17***  –0.10* 0.6  0.64  35 
1  Estimates of the model  t t t t t
T
t t t f f y y R                      1
*
1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( , excluding the period Q1 2008–Q3 2009 
and previous crises. R is the nominal policy rate; π is the headline inflation rate; π
T is the inflation target for inflation 
targeting countries; the five-year moving average of headline inflation is taken to be a proxy for the inflation objective in 
the other economies; y is output; y* is the output trend estimated with a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter 
1,600);  f is the year-on-year nominal effective exchange rate change. For Brazil, overnight Selic rate; for Chile, 
overnight interbank interest rate; for China, one-year lending rate; for the Czech Republic, two-week repo rate; for Hong 
Kong SAR, discount window base rate; for Hungary, base rate (two-week deposit rate); for India, reverse repo rate; for 
Indonesia, one-month SBI rate; for Korea, overnight call rate; for Malaysia, overnight policy rate; for Mexico, overnight 
repo rate; for Peru, reference rate; for the Philippines, overnight reserve repo rate; for Poland, seven-day reference 
rate; for Singapore, three-month interbank rate; for Thailand, 14-day repo rate before 17 January 2007, overnight repo 
thereafter; for Turkey, overnight interbank rate.    
†  For Mexico and Turkey, the dependent variable is replaced with an 
inflation trend-augmented nominal policy rate, ) ( t t t r R    , where   is the trend of inflation and     R r . 
*/
**/
*** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10/5/1% level. 
Sources: Bloomberg; © Consensus Economics; Datastream; national data; BIS calculations.  




Central bank publications on the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates 
Colombia 
Echavarría, J, E López and M Misas (2007): “La tasa de cambio real de equilibrio en Colombia y su 
desalineamiento: estimación a través de un modelo SVEC”, Borradores de Economía, vol 472, Banco 
de la República. 
Czech Republic 
Methodological/summary papers  
Frait, J and L Komárek (1999): “Long-run equilibrium exchange rate and its determinants”, Research 
Paper of the Monetary Section of the Czech National Bank, no 9 (in Czech). 
Horváth, R and L Komárek (2007): “Equilibrium exchange rates in the EU new members: 
methodology, estimation and applicability to ERM II”, Prague Economic Papers, no 1, pp 24–37. 
BEER and PEER 
Babetskii, I and B Égert (2005): “Equilibrium exchange rate in the Czech Republic: how good is the 
Czech BEER?”, Finance a úvěr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 5–6, pp 232–52.  
Frait, J, L Komárek and M Melecký (2006): “The real exchange rate misalignment in the five central 
European countries”, Warwick Economics Research Papers, no 739, Department of Economics, 
University of Warwick.  
——— (2008): “The real exchange rate misalignment in the five central European countries – single 
equation approach”, in P Karadeloglou and V Terraza (eds), Exchange rates and macroeconomic 
dynamics.  
Komárek, L and M Melecký (2005): “The behavioral equilibrium exchange rate of the Czech koruna”, 
Czech National Bank Working Papers, no 5.  
——— (2007): “The behavioral equilibrium exchange rate of the Czech koruna”, Transition Studies 
Review, 14(1), pp 105–21. 
——— (2008): “Transitional appreciation of equilibrium exchange rates and the ERM II”, Transition 
Studies Review, 15(1), pp 95–110.  
FEER and SRER 
Babecký, J, A Bulíř and K Šmídková (2008): “Sustainable real exchange rates when trade winds are 
plentiful”, National Institute Economic Review, no 204, pp 98–107, April. 
——— (2009): “Sustainable real exchange rates in the new EU member states: is FDI a mixed 
blessing?”, European Economy Economic Papers, no 368, p 77, March.  
——— (2010a): “Sustainable real exchange rates in the new EU member states: what did the great 
recession change?”, IMF Working Papers, no 10/198.  
——— (2010b): “Sustainable real exchange rates in the new EU member states: is FDI a mixed 
blessing?”, Chapter 9 in F Keerman and I Székely (eds), Five years of an enlarged EU: a positive 
sum game, Springer, pp 153–82.  
Bulíř, A and K Šmídková (2005): “Sustainable real exchange rates in the new EU accession 
countries: what have we learned from the frontrunners?”, Economic Systems, 29(2), pp 163–86. 
Šmídková, K, R Barrell and D Holland (2002): “Estimates of fundamental real exchange rates for the 
five EU pre-accession countries”, Czech National Bank Working Papers, no 3.  
Other approaches based on pricing-to-market (disparity) 
Cincibuch, M and J Podpiera (2006): “Beyond Balassa-Samuelson: real appreciation in tradables in 
transition countries”, Economics of Transition, 13(3), pp 547–73.  
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Table A3 (continued) 
Central bank publications on the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates 
Czech Republic (continued) 
Based on underlying factor decomposition in an extended international consumption-based CAPM 
(Kalman filter) 
Brůha, J and A Derviz (2006): “Macroeconomic factors and the balanced value of the Czech 
koruna/euro exchange rate”, Finance a úvěr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 56, 7–8, 
pp 318–43.  
Derviz, A (2004): “Exchange rate risks and asset prices in a small open economy”, ECB Working 
Papers, no 314, March. 
Hong Kong SAR 
Leung, F and P Ng (2007): “Is the Hong Kong dollar real exchange rate misaligned?”, Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority Working Papers, no 21/2007, 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/research/working/pdf/HKMAWP07_21_full.pdf. 
Hungary 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2010): Analysis of the convergence process, Box 1–1 on p 6, 
http://english.mnb.hu/Kiadvanyok/mnben_konvergenciajelentes/mnben_konvjel_20100519. 
Israel 
Bank of Israel (2008): “The real appreciation in 2008 and the equilibrium real exchange rate”, Annual 
Report, Box 2.2 on pp 68–71. 
Peru 
BEER model  
Ferreyra, J and J Salas (2006): “The equilibrium real exchange rate in Peru: BEER models and 




Rodríguez, D and M Vega (2008): “Incertidumbre en estimaciones del tipo de cambio real de 




Halikias, I (2009): “Workers’ remittances and external equilibrium: an application to the Philippines”, 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas International Research Conference on Remittances, paper no 5. 
Poland 
International Comparison Programme: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/18/18598721.pdf. 
Survey of firm-level data: http://www.nbp.pl/home.aspx?c=/ascx/koniunktura_prezentacja.ascx. 
IMF’s CGER estimates: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10118.pdf. 
Bęza-Bojanowska, J (2009): “Behavioral and permanent euro/zloty equilibrium rate”, Central 
European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, no 1, pp 35–55. 
Isard, P (2007): “Equilibrium exchange rates: assessment methodologies”, IMF Working Papers, 
no 296. 
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